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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff Appellant,

:

v.
RYAN WAYNE JOHNSON,

Case No. 20040522-CA

Defendant/Appellee.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (2002). The State is appealing an interlocutory order
granting the Defendant's motion to reduce the charges of aggravated robbery, first degree
felonies in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003), to robbery, second degree
felonies. A copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION
Issue. Whether the trial court correctly concluded that the evidence did not
support a charge of aggravated robbery where the defendant had his hand in his pocket
and demanded money but did not show the clerk a weapon or facsimile and did not make
any verbal representations about a gun or weapon.1

1

A similar issue is before this Court in the defendant's appeal in State v. Ireland,
Case No. 20040502-CA. In that case, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to
reduce the charge from aggravated robbery to robbery.

Standard of Review. '"The correct interpretation of a statute is a question of law
and is reviewed for correctness.'" State v. Pixton. 2004 UT App 275, ^4, 98 P.3d 433
(quoting State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993)).
Preservation. The issue was preserved below. Case No. 041900176 ("Rl") Rl.
135-139, 140-146, 167-172; Case No. 041900182 ("R2") R2. 35-41,44-50; 58-63; R.
174

TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES
The text of the following statutes is in Addendum B:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (5)(b) (2003).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In an Information filed January 9, 2004, the State charged Appellee Ryan W.
Johnson ("Appellee" or "Mr. Johnson") with four counts of aggravated robbery, first
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (2003).2 Rl. 6-9. Another
Information was filed on the same day charging Mr. Johnson with two additional counts
of aggravated robbery, first degree felonies. R2. 6-8. Following bind-over (R. 173), Mr.
Johnson filed a memorandum in support of a motion to reduce the six counts of
aggravated robbery to second degree felonies. Rl. 135-139. After the State responded

2

The Information incorrectly cites aggravated robbery as a violation of Utah Code
Ann. §76-6-301. Rl.6-9
2

(RL 140-146; R2. 35-41, 44-50), the trial court held a hearing on the motion on May 19,
2004. R. 174. The trial court granted the motion and entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on July 1, 2004. Rl. 167-172; R2. 58-63; 173:15-16.
On June 11, 2004, the State filed a motion to stay the trial. Rl. 153; R2. 64-65.
The trial court granted the State's motion to stay the jury trial. RL 155; R2. 69. On June
22, 2004, the State filed a petition for interlocutory appeal with the Utah Supreme Court.
RL 163. On June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court transferred the interlocutory appeal to
this Court for disposition. RL 165 -166.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Two different Informations filed on January 9, 2004, charged Mr. Johnson with a
total of six counts of aggravated robbery. Rl. 6-9; R2. 6-8 . The Informations allege that
Mr. Johnson was the individual responsible for these crimes which occurred in December
2003 and January 2004.3 RL 6-9; R2 6-8. The following facts are taken from the
preliminary hearing held on February 10, 2004. R. 173.
Case No. 041900176
Count I: On December 21, 2003, Lisa Ovard, store manager, was working at the
Sinclair gas station on 3310 South and 700 East in Salt Lake City. R. 173:9. "A
gentleman came in with his head wrapped up in a white T-shirt and walked up to the

3

Mr. Johnson does not concede that he is actually the individual who committed
these crimes. However, for purposes of this appeal only and to limit confusion, Mr.
Johnson is referred to as the individual having committed these offenses.
3

counter." R. 173:9. Ovard thought the man was wearing the T-shirt around his head
because it was cold outside. R. 173:10. The man had his right hand in his front coat
pocket. R. 173:11. With his right hand in his pocket, the man placed his hand on the
counter pointing it towards Ovard and placed a "Spitz Sunflower Seed bag on the
counter" and asked Ovard to "put the money in the bag.'1 R. 173:10. Ovard asked the
man if he wanted the change also. R. 173:11. The man replied that he wanted the
quarters. R. 173:11. Ovard did not see anything in the man's hand. R. 173:13. Ovard
thought the object in the coat pocket "was either a gun or a finger." R. 173:14. The man
did not make any motions with his hand such as moving his arm up and down. R.
173:14. Although Ovard did not know if he had a gun she testified that she was afraid
for her life. R. 173:11. The man did not say that he had a gun, did not make any
threatening gestures, and did not threaten Ovard that he was going to harm her in any
way. R. 173:15-16.
Count II: On December 22, 2003, Cynthia West, was working as a cashier at
Phillips 66 on 315 East and 3900 South in Salt Lake City. R. 173:17. While West was
changing the coffee filters, a man came in wearing a scarf over his face. R. 173:17. The
man handed West a bag that West thought he wanted to have thrown away. R. 173:18.
The man told West to "Fill it with money." R. 173:18, 21. West noticed that man had
his right hand in his pocket of his sweatshirt which looked like he had a gun. R. 173:18.
The man raised up his hand in his pocket about waist high with his index finger
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extended. R. 173:23. The man did not point it at her. R. 173:24. West told police that
she "didn't know whether it was his finger or a Tootsie Roll or a gun." R. 173:19, 23.
Although, the man did not tell West he had a gun, did not make any threats, and did not
make any aggressive motions towards her, West testified that she feared for her life. R.
173:19, 23. West opened up the register and gave the man all the cash and asked him if
he wanted all the coins as well. R. 173:18. The man said he wanted the quarters. R.
173:19. West then said "Here's a couple of gold dollars for you, too." R. 173:19. West
then asked if she could get the man anything else and he said "No, that's all I need." R.
173:19. West then said "Alrighty then, you have a good day." R. 173:19.
Count III: On December 23, 2003, Jennifer Forsgren worked as a cashier at
Tesoro on 1200 West and 3900 South in Salt Lake City. R. 173:27. A man came into
the store with a scarf wrapped around his head covering his face except for his eyes. R.
173:28. Because it was cold outside, Forsgren did not think anything of it. R. 173:28.
The man put a bag on the counter and said "Put the money in the bag." R. 173:29. The
man had his right hand in his pocket and Forsgren assumed he had a gun. R. 173:29.
However, the man did not have any of his fingers protruding in his pocket and did not
raise it up in any manner. R. 173:32. The man just kind of stood there with his hand
resting in his pocket. R. 173:32. Forsgren put the money in the bag and gave it to the
man. R. 173:29. The man never said he had a gun or a weapon of any kind. R. 173:32.
The man did not threaten Forsgren or move towards her in any threatening manner. R.
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173:32. Even though it was cold outside, Forsgren assumed he had a gun because he had
his hand resting inside his pocket. R. 173:33.
Count IV: On December 24, 2003, Allan Cantonwine was working as a clerk at
Phillips 66 on 315 East and 3900 South in Salt Lake City. R. 173:35. As he came in for
work, his co-worker, Myeong-Ock Kim, asked him "How do you open the register?" R.
173:35. There was a man with a thick jacket on and a white scarf over his face behind
the counter with Kim. R. 173:35, 42. There was a baggy sitting on the counter and the
man told Cantonwine to put the money in the bag. R. 173:37. Cantonwine put the
money in the bag because he received training while working at 7-eleven to "Always do
what you're told." R. 173:37. Cantonwine noticed that the man had his hand in his
pocket with a finger extended. R. 173:37. Cantonwine testified that it could have been a
candy bar, a finger, or a gun. R. 173:37. However, if it was a gun, he "didn't want him
to shoot [Cantonwine]. If it was his finger, [Cantonwine] didn't care. [He] was just
going to do what [he] was told." R. 173:38. The man never said he had a gun, never
told Cantonwine that he would be harmed, and did not make any verbal threats at all. R.
173:44.
Case No. 041900182
Count I: On January 6, 2004, Julie Valdez was employed at A Appliance &
Refrigeration on 501 East and 2700 South in Salt Lake City. R. 173:60. A man came in
and Valdez asked him if she could help him. R. 173:61. The man said "Give me your
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money." R. 173:61. The man "protruded whatever he had in his pocket." R. 173:63.
"Whether it was a gun or not, [Valdez did not] know." R. 173:63. Valdez testified that
she "didn't think he [had a gun] because the bulge wasn't big enough." R. 173:66.
Valdez told the man that she "didn't have any" money. R. 173:62. The man said "Yes,
you do." R. 173:62. Valdez told the man that she didn't keep money there and asked the
man if he saw a cash register around. R. 173:62. The man thought the microfiche
equipment was a register. R. 173:62. Valdez told the man that it was a microfiche
machine and again stated that she did not have any cash. R. 173:62. The man looked at
Valdez and asked as if he had given up "You don't have even $20?" R. 173:62. Valdez
said "No. I told you, I don't have any money." R. 173:62. The man then turned and left.
R. 173:62. Valdez testified that the man never said he had a gun and never threaten her.
R. 173:66. Valdez testified that the man "was very nice-spoken, soft-spoken, not
aggressive, not anything that would make you think that he was going to cause you harm.
He was a nice-spoken young man." R. 173:66.
Count II: On January 6, 2004, Ester Cho was working at her store, Young's Food
Mart, on 1249 South 900 East in Salt Lake City. R. 173:69. A man came into the store
and walked up to the counter with his hand pointed in his pocket and asked Cho for
money. R. 173:70. Cho "didn't know exactly what it was [in the man's pocket] but it
scared" her. R. 173:71. Although Cho had more money in the register, she gave him
$20 and told the man he was "committing a crime." R. 173:71, 72. The man responded
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that he would pay her back and then left the store. R. 173:71. The man did not tell Cho
he had a gun and did not say anything threatening towards her. R. 173:72-73.
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the trial court bound Mr. Johnson
over on all six felony counts of aggravated robbery. R. 30-31; 173:87; R2. 28-29. On
May 3, 2004, Mr. Johnson filed a motion to reduce Counts I through IV in Case No.
041900176 and Counts I and II in Case No. 041099182 to second degree felonies. Rl.
135-139. On May 13, 2004 the State filed a memorandum in opposition to Mr.
Johnson's motion. Rl. 140-146; R2. 35-41, 44-50. On May 19, 2004, the trial court
held a hearing on Mr. Johnson's motion to reduce all six counts from aggravated
robberies to simple robberies. R. 174. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court
granted Mr. Johnson's motion finding that under the facts of this case, more is required
to show aggravated robbery than just a hand in the pocket. R. 174:16. A copy of the
hearing transcript is in Addendum C.
The State filed a petition for interlocutory appeal with the Utah Supreme Court.
R. 163. On June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court transferred the interlocutory appeal to this
Court for disposition. R. 165.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court was correct in granting Mr. Johnson's motion to reduce the charges
of aggravated robbery to simple robbery. All robberies involve a threat and fear by the
victim. In order to elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery, the conduct of the
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defendant, not the subjective reaction of the victim, controls. Moreover, in order to
maintain the distinction between an aggravated and simple robbery, the defendant must
do more than create a threat or cause fear. Instead, the defendant must make a tangible
representation that he has an item and, further, make a tangible representation that the
item in his control is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. A hand in a
pocket even when pointed in the direction of a complainant, in absence of a verbal
representation, fails to rise to this level.
However, even if a hand in a pocket without more constitutes a "representation"
under the statute, more is required before it is considered a dangerous weapon. For a
representation to fall within the meaning of a dangerous weapon, the complainants must
possess a reasonable belief that the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury.
The complainants in this case did not possess the requisite reasonable belief necessary
under the statute. Therefore, the trial court correctly granted defendant's motion to
reduce the charges to second degree felonies.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT UNDER
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGES
SHOULD BE REDUCED TO SIMPLE ROBBERY WHERE THE APPELLEE
DID NOT DISPLAY A GUN AND DID NOT MAKE A VERBAL
REPRESENTATION REGARDING THE USE OF A GUN.
The trial court correctly concluded "under the specific facts of this case .. . there
was insufficient evidence to establish that [Mr. Johnson] made a "representation" of a
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dangerous weapon sufficient to comply with the requirements" under Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-302. See R. 167-172. The trial court based its conclusion on the fact that "there
were no verbal statements accompanied by any physical action similar to the
"representation" found in State v. Canderlario. 909 P.2d 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)." R.
171-72.
In State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987), the supreme court held that the
defendant did not commit an aggravated robbery where he had his hand in his pocket
held up over the counter as if he had a gun, with something pointing at the victim, and
made threats that he would "blast" people if they did not cooperate. IJL at 962. The
version of section 76-6-302 then in effect defined aggravated robbery as a robbery where
the perpetrator used "a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm." Id. The Suniville court
concluded that the defendant's actions did not amount to an aggravated robbery because
he did not use a weapon or a replica of a weapon. Id. at 964-65. In reaching that
conclusion, the Court reasoned that any other holding would "erode the statutory
distinction between robbery and aggravated robbery." IcL_ at 965. The court stated in
part, "Defendant's menacing gesture accompanied by verbal threats is not sufficient
evidence alone to establish the use of a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm. To hold
otherwise would pervert the language of section 76-6-302 and erode the statutory
distinction between robbery and aggravated robbery." Id.
Following the decision in Suniville, the legislature amended the aggravated
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robbery and dangerous weapon statutes. The current version requires the use or
threatened use of a dangerous weapon and defines a dangerous weapon in part as a
facsimile or representation of a dangerous weapon. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-302 (2003),
76-1-601 (2003). Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003), which outlines the elements for
aggravated robbery, states, "(1) [a] person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of
committing robbery, he: (a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-60l(5)(b) (2003) defines a dangerous
weapon as "a facsimile or representation of the item, and (i) the actor's use or apparent
intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury; or (ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any
other manner that he is in control of such an item." IdL_ (emphasis added).
Under the current version of the statute, this Court has interpreted the term
representation in the dangerous weapon statute to include a verbal representation that one
has a firearm. See State v. Candelario. 909 P.2d 277, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v.
Adams. 830 P.2d 310 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Nevertheless, the concerns outlined in
Suniville that the distinction between aggravated and simple robbery must be maintained
and that defendant must do or say something tangible beyond the force and fear involved
in any robbery continue to control. This Court's holdings that a verbal representation by
the robber that he has a gun is sufficiently tangible to support an aggravated robbery
maintains a distinction between the two crimes that is lost when a hand in the pocket
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without verbal representations is used to elevate the crime.
For example, the defendant in Candelario claimed to have a gun and threatened to
kill the clerk but did not physically portray possession of a firearm. IdL at 277. Under
these circumstances, the determination of whether a gun was involved was not left to the
subjective reaction of the victim because the defendant verbally represented that he had a
gun. This Court concluded that the term "representation" refers not only to a physical
likeness, but also to Ma statement conveying an impression for the purpose of influencing
action." Id at 278.
The robber in Adams verbally threatened to use a gun while also f,put[ing] his
hand on his bulging pocket, leading [the victim] to believe [the robber] had a gun and
reasonably fear for her safety." Adams. 830 P.2d at 313. This Court upheld the
aggravated robbery conviction because "[threatening to use a dangerous weapon while
committing a robbery . . . is sufficient to fit within the aggravated robbery . .. statute[]."
IcL (citing State v. Hartmann. 783 P.2d 544 (Utah 1989). In reaching the decision in
Adams, this Court relied on Hartmann, which upheld a conviction for aggravated sexual
assault where the defendant raped a woman while verbally telling her that he had a gun.
Id. This Court concluded in Hartmann that the use or display of a dangerous weapon is
not required when the defendant makes a verbal threat to use a dangerous weapon. IcL_ at
547.
Recently, in State v. Revos. 2004 UT App 151,91 P.3d 861, this Court again held
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that a defendant's statements that he had a gun were a representation that elevated a
robbery to an aggravated robbery even if the defendant did not have a gun. In that case,
the defendant yelled, "[g]et the gun and shoot" and "shoot to kill." IcL at Tf4. This Court
reasoned that defendant's statement "clearly 'conveyed an impression5 that a gun would
be used 'for the purpose of influencing actionf]'" and the aggravated robbery charge was
therefore appropriate. Id.
Pursuant to Adams, Candelario, Hartmann, and Reyos, a charge of aggravated
robbery would have been appropriate if Appellant had made verbal representations
regarding a gun. Mr. Johnson is not accused of making any such verbal representations.
Instead, Mr. Johnson, at most, is accused of having his finger extended in his pocket
during a couple of the encounters where he asked for money to be put in a bag. To be
convicted of aggravated robbery, Mr. Johnson would have had to "use or threaten to use
a dangerous weapon." Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302. The dangerous weapon statute
requires a representation, that is, some sort of likeness, coupled with either a verbal
representation that the item is a dangerous weapon or some representation "in any other
manner" that the robber is in control of an item that is likely to cause death or serious
bodily injury. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (5)(b).
The use of the word "and" in section 76-l-601(5)(b) demonstrates that something
more than just a representation of an item is required; instead, the defendant must make a
representation of an item and further represent that the item is likely to cause death or
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serious bodily injury. Even if a finger in the pocket were considered a "representation of
an item,'1 it fails to meet the requirements of subsection (ii) since a hand in the pocket
does not amount to a representation that the item is capable of causing death or serious
bodily injury. In fact, in this case, the complainants speculated that there was a weapon
in the pocket but had no basis for determining whether the item in the pocket was
anything more than "a Tootsie Roll, a finger, or a gun," let alone that the item was
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. R. 173:14, 19, 23, 37. Some of the
complainants' testimony that they were afraid because they thought Mr. Johnson might
have a gun because his hand was in his pocket was their subjective response to the fear
they felt during the robbery and was based on speculation rather than a representation by
Mr. Johnson that he had a weapon capable of causing serious bodily injury. Allowing a
witness's subjective reaction under circumstances that necessarily involve threats and
fear fails to make a workable distinction between simple and aggravated robbery.
The court in Williams v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Ky. 1986),
concluded that the defendant did not commit an aggravated robbery where he "threatened
the night clerk by reaching towards his back pocket and cautioning, 'Do you want your
life?5" IcL at 711. Similar to the present case, the clerk in that case testified "that when
he was threatened, he believed 'maybe he (Appellant) had a weapon or something.5" IcL
In rejecting the aggravated robbery charge, the court recognized that threat of harm exists
in simple robbery as well as aggravated robbery, and the two charges must be
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distinguished by something other than the threat of physical harm. IcL_ Moreover, the
complainant's response to a threat cannot define the nature of the crime and a
complainant's speculation that there might have been a weapon does not support an
aggravated robbery charge. This is so because the degree of the crime would be left to
the subjective response of the victim, not the actions of the perpetrator. IcL at 712.
To do otherwise places defendant virtually without defense at the caprice
of a victim's subjective evaluation without regard to the actual course of
events and could least to convictions for crimes neither intended nor
enacted. Our heritage of justice applies the law to the facts. Herein the fact
is that although force was threatened, the presence of a weapon or
instrument was illusory at best. Without an instrument ever being seen, an
intimidating threat, albeit coupled with a menacing gesture cannot suffice
to meet the standard necessary for a first degree robbery conviction.
IcL at 712. While a verbal threat to use a gun would suffice for an aggravated robbery
charge, in Williams where the defendant threatened only to hurt the clerk then reached
toward his back pocket, the facts did not rise to an aggravated robbery. Indeed, labeling
a crime as an armed robbery under these circumstances would blur the distinction
between simple and aggravated robbery. The Williams court recognized this, stating:
This, however, does not distinguish it from second degree robbery in which
the threat of physical force is the gravamen. A response of perceiving
danger is quite real under threat; however, such cannot serve to convert
something merely speculated upon (a weapon or instrument) into
established existence . . . . Without an instrument ever being seen, an
intimidating threat albeit coupled with a menacing gesture cannot suffice to
meet the standard necessary for a first-degree robbery conviction
Without something tangible backing up the threat, words do not reach
beyond the status of threats and as such are insufficient to sustain
submission under first-degree robbery.
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14 at 712-13.
Focusing on the actions of the defendant rather than the subjective response of the
complainant is consistent not only with Suniville but also with the language of
subsection (ii) which requires the robber to represent that he is in control of an item that
the victim reasonably believes is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. This
reasonable belief language necessarily involves an objective review of the defendant's
conduct rather than a focus on the victim's subjective reaction.
In Michigan, the appellate courts have "long recognized that the victim's
subjective belief alone is insufficient to support a conviction of armed robbery." State v.
Taylor, 628 N.W.2d 55 (Mich. 2001) (emphasis in original). To prove armed robbery
under the Michigan state statute, the state must prove that a robber "possess[ed] a
dangerous weapon, or an article used or fashioned in a manner to lead any person present
to reasonably believe the article [was] a dangerous weapon." Mich. Comp. Laws
§750.529 (2004)4 (emphasis added). "In a 'feigned weapon' case, the prosecutor meets
the 'armed' requirement of the statute by proving that during the commission of a
robbery the defendant simulated a weapon so as to induce the victim to reasonably
believe he was armed." Taylor, 628 N.W.2d at 58. The Taylor court explained that

4

The statute under which Taylor was decided required the state to prove essentially
the same elements in order to sustain a conviction of armed robbery, that is, a robber was
"armed with a dangerous weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the
person so assaulted to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon."
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while a "portion of the armed robbery statute focuses on the belief of the victim that the
defendant was armed, that belief must be reasonable and [the Michigan] courts have long
recognized that the victim's subjective belief alone is insufficient to support a conviction
of armed robbery." Id at 59 (emphasis in original). Instead,
There must be some objective evidence of the existence of a weapon or
article before a jury will be permitted to assess the merits of an armed
robbery charge. For example, an object pointing out from under a coat,
together with statements threatening a victim with being shot, clearly
satisfies the statutory definition of armed robbery. In such a case, there is
evidence of actual possession of a weapon or article and the testimony
regarding the statements that, if believed, make clear an intent to convince
the victim of the existence of such a weapon or article.
Id. (citations omitted).
In Taylor, the court determined that the evidence presented at trial "went well
beyond a mere subjective belief that defendant was armed during the robbery." IdL at 61.
The court found the quantum of objective evidence led the complainant to reasonably
believe that the defendant had a gun.
Complainant testified that, during the robbery, defendant placed his hand
inside his jacket and into the front of his pants. Objectively, defendant
could have carried a weapon under his jacket and in his waistband. As in
[People v. Jolly, 502 N.W.2d 177 (Mich. 1993)], complainant also testified
to the presence of a bulge in defendant's jacket, indicating that defendant
actually possessed a weapon or fashioned his hand or some other article to
feign a weapon. Complainant specifically stated, "I knew there was a piece
in there the way he grabbed it and the way it was [sic] his hand and the
jacket were bulged." Indeed, defendant's hand grabbed for and remained
on the bulge inside his jacket as he took the money from the register and
left the station.
This visual evidence was bolstered by complainant's testimony that
defendant made a verbal threat, "This is a stick up," while grabbing for the
17

object in his jacket. While defendant did not specifically threaten to shoot
complainant, the phrase "this is a stick upM is universally understood to
indicate the presence of a weapon.
Id
The court determined that "this threat, along with defendant's demand that complainant
open the cash register, could objectively lead complainant to believe that defendant
possessed a gun or other dangerous weapon.'1 IcL_
In this case, the trial court correctly concluded that more than the complainants
subjective belief that Mr. Johnson might have a gun in his pocket was required under the
statute. Otherwise, the distinction between aggravated robbery and simple robbery
would be eroded leaving defendants "at the caprice of a victim's subjective evaluation"
in determining whether an aggravated robbery was committed. Williams, 721 S.W. 2d at
712. All robberies necessarily involve fear by the victim and threats causing this fear
which propels the victim to respond to the robber's request. But a robbery where the
robber actually carries a gun, facsimile or other dangerous weapon or represents that he
has a gun raises a far greater threat than a robbery such as this one where the robber
simply had his hand in his pocket.
POINT II. EVEN IF THIS COURT DETERMINES A HAND IN A
POCKET WITHOUT MORE CONSTITUTES A "REPRESENTATION"
UNDER THE STATUTE. THE COMPLAINANTS' BELIEF WAS NOT
REASONABLE.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 requires the following elements to be met
before an item is considered a dangerous weapon. An actor must produce a "a facsimile
18

or representation" of a dangerous weapon and the "actor's use or apparent intended use
of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or
serious bodily injury; or the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner
that he is in control" of an item that is likely to cause death or serious bodily must be
made." IcL Even if this Court were to determine that a hand in the pocket alone is a
"representation" within the meaning of the statute, it must also be shown that the
complainants reasonably believed that the item possessed was likely to cause death or
serious bodily injury. In this case, the evidence shows that the complainants either did
not reasonably believe that Mr. Johnson had a gun or did not reasonably believe that the
item "was likely to cause death or serious bodily injury." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1601.
For example, in support of Count III, in Case No. 041900176, the State called
Jennifer Forsgren to testify regarding the events that occurred at a Tesoro gas station on
December 23, 2003. R. 173:27. Forsgren testified that it was cold outside so she did not
think anything of the man walking in with a scarf wrapped around his face and head. R.
173:28. The man put a bag on the counter and asked Forsgren to "Put the money in the
bag." R. 173:29. Despite it being cold outside, Forsgren assumed because Mr. Johnson
had his hand resting in his coat pocket, he had a gun. R. 173:29. Forsgren testified that
she did not see any fingers protruding from Mr. Johnson's coat, instead, Mr. Johnson's
hand was just kind of resting in his pocket down at his side. R. 173:29. Mr. Johnson did
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not tell Forsgren he had a gun, did not verbally threaten her, and did not move toward her
in a threatening manner.
A hand resting in one's pocket on a cold winter's day does not qualify as a
"representation" of a dangerous weapon under the statute. Moreover, a hand simply
resting in ones pocket even when asking for money does not give rise to a reasonable
belief that the actor is in possession of an item that will cause death or serious bodily
injury.
Similarly, Julie Valdez's testimony, in support of4Count I in Case No. 041900182,
did not support a reasonable belief that Mr. Johnson made a representation that he was in
possession of an item that would cause death or serious bodily injury. R. 173:59-66.
Valdez testified that she was working on January 6, 2004 at A Appliance & Refrigeration
Company when a man came in and said "Give me your money." R. 173:60-61. Valdez
testified that when asking for the money, Mr. Johnson "protruded whatever he had in his
pocket. . . whether it was a gun or not, I don't know." R. 173:63. Valdez testified that
she "didn't think it was one thing or another" but "kind of didn't think he did [have a
gun] because the bulge wasn't big enough." R. 173:63,66. Valdez testified that after
they had discussed that she didn't have any money, Mr. Johnson stated like he had given
up "Oh, well, have you go at least $20?" R. 173:66. Valdez testified that Mr. Johnson
never said he had gun and never threatened her. R. 173:66. In fact, Valdez described
Mr. Johnson as a "very nice-spoken, soft-spoken, not aggressive, not anything that would
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make you think that he was going to cause you harm. He was a nice-spoken young man."
R. 173:66.
Valdez's testimony does not support a finding that she had a reasonable belief that
Mr. Johnson was in possession of an item that would cause death or serious bodily
injury. Valdez testified that she did not believe that Mr. Johnson had a gun because "the
bulge wasn't big enough." R. 173:66. In fact, Valdez's testified that Mr. Johnson did
not do "anything that would make you think that he was going to cause you harm." R.
173:66.
Allan Cantonwine's testimony also fails to support a reasonable belief that Mr.
Johnson was in possession of an item that would cause death or serious bodily injury as
required under the statute. The State called Cantonwine to testify, in support of Count
IV, Case No. 041900176, regarding what occurred on December 24, 2003 at a Phillips
gas station. R. 173:35. Cantonwine testified that Mr. Johnson told him to "put the
money in the bag." R. 173:37. Cantonwine testified that he put the money in the bag
because he has been taught in prior employment training to "Always do what you're
told." R. 173:37. Cantonwine testified that Mr. Johnson also had his hand in his pocket
with his finger extended. R. 173:37. Cantonwine testified on direct that "It could have
been a candy bar, a finger, a gun. I didn't know, so I just did what he said. If it was a
gun, I didn't want him to shoot me. If it was his finger, I didn't care. I was just going to
do what I was told." R. 173:37-38. Mr. Johnson never said he had a gun and never
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made any threats at all. R. 173:44.
Cantonwine's testimony does not support that he had a reasonable belief that Mr.
Johnson possessed an item that would cause death or serious bodily injury. Cantonwine
testified that he put the money in the bag because that was what he has been trained to
do, to "Always do what you're told." R. 173:37. Cantonwine testified that Mr. Johnson
could have been carrying a candy bar or simply have his finger in his pocket. This
testimony fails to support the proof necessary for an aggravated robbery under the statue.
Likewise, the testimony of the three other witnesses fails to support a reasonable
belief that during these robberies, Mr. Johnson was in possession of an item likely to
cause death or serious bodily injury. In support of Count I, the State called Lisa Ovard to
testify regarding the events that occurred at a Sinclair gas station on December 21, 2003.
R. 173:8. Ovard testified that "a gentleman came in with his head wrapped up in a white
T-shirt and walked up to the counter." R. 173:9. Ovard just thought the man had his
head wrapped up because it was cold outside. R. 173:10. Mr. Johnson then put a Spitz
Sunflower Seed bag on the counter and told Ovard to "put the money in the bag." R.
173:10. As he did this, Mr. Johnson also placed his hand which was in his coat pocket
on the counter pointed toward Ovard. R. 173:11. Mr. Johnson did not make any
motions with his hand, did not make any threatening gestures, and did not threaten Ovard
in any way verbally. R. 173:14-14. Ovard thought "it was either a gun or a finger" in his
pocket." R. 173:14.
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The State called Cynthia West to testify in support of Count II regarding the
events that occurred at a Phillips gas station on December 22, 2003. R. 173:17. West
testified that Mr. Johnson handed her a bag and asked her to "fill it." R. 173:18. West
noticed Mr. Johnson had his hand in his sweatshirt pocket with his finger extended. R.
173:18. West told police officers that she "didn't know if it was his finger or a Tootsie
Roll or a gun." R. 173:19. Mr. Johnson did not tell West he had a gun, did not make any
aggressive motions towards West, and did not threaten her. R. 173:23.
Finally, the State called Esther Cho, in support of Count II, Case No. 041900182,
to testify regarding what occurred on January 6, 2004 at her food mart. R. 173:69. Cho
testified that a man whom she could not identify came into her store. R. 173:70-71. The
man "put his hand in his pocket and pointed, not necessarily toward me, but he did ask
me for the money at the same time while he was also pointing." R. 173:70. Cho did not
know what exactly was in his pocket. R. 173:71. Cho gave the man $20, even though
she had more in the register and told him "You're committing a crime." R. 173:71. The
man said he would pay her back and then left the store. R. 173:71. The man did not say
he had a gun and did not threaten her in any way. R. 173:72-73.
The trial court correctly concluded that none of these complainants' testimony was
sufficient to support an aggravated robbery charge. Rl: 167-172. None of the
complainants could tell whether Mr. Johnson had a gun or simply a piece of candy or a
finger in his pocket. Even if a hand in the pocket could be a "representation" under that
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statute, under the facts of this case, the complainants' subjective speculation as to
whether Mr. Johnson possessed a dangerous weapon in his pocket is insufficient to prove
aggravated robbery . Therefore, even if this Court finds that Mr. Johnson's hand in his
pocket falls within the meaning of a representation under the statute, the complainants'
testimony fails to support that they had a reasonable belief that he possessed an item
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. In the absence of a verbal threat, the
benign conduct of holding a hand in a pocket fails to elevate the conduct to an
aggravated robbery. Therefore, under the facts of this case, the trial court correctly
reduced the aggravated robbery charges to simple robbery.
CONCLUSION
Appellee/Defendant Ryan Wayne Johnson respectfully requests that this Court
affirm the trial court's order granting his motion to reduce the charges to second degree
felonies.
SUBMITTED this a\** day of December, 2004.

DEBRA M.NELSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee

PATRICK L. ANDERSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

RYAN WAYNE JOHNSON,
Defendant.

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

:

Case Nos. 041900176 & 041900182

:

JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS

Based upon the Motion of the Defendant, all Memorandum filed by both parties herein,
a full review of the transcript of the Preliminary Hearing held on February 10, 2004
(hereinafter referred to as 'Transcript' or 'Tr'), argument on the Motion and good cause
appearing the Court herein makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the Court has reviewed all Motions and Memorandum filed in this case as well as
the full transcript of the Preliminary Hearing conducted on February 10, 2004.

2.

That in Counts I through IV in Case no. 041900176 the Defendant entered
Convenience/Gas Stations with a scarf or shirt wrapped around his head with only his
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eyes visible.

That in Counts I and II in Case no. 041900182 the Defendant entered a business which
was a non-retail establishment and Young's Market with a hooded sweatshirt pulled up
over his head and was wearing either a hat or a cap.

That Lisa Ovard (Count I, Case no. 041900176) testified that the Defendant came into
the store with his right hand inside of his coat or sweatshirt and put his right hand on
the counter and did not move the hand once it was on the counter. That either a gun or
a finger was pointing inside of Defendant's sweater or sweatshirt that was resting on the
counter. Tr at 10 and 14.

That the Defendant told Lisa Ovard to "put the money in the bag". Tj\ at 11 and 14.
That at no time did the Defendant tell Lisa Ovard that he had a gun or did he threaten
with a gun or give her a note which made any reference to a gun.

That Cynthia West (Count II, Case no. 041900176) testified that the Defendant came in
to her store with his hand in his right pocket and gave her a bag and asked her to "fill
it". T|\at21.

That Cynthia West testified the Defendant did point something in his pocket and said
that "it could have been a Tootsie Roll, a finger, or a gun". TY at 23. That at no
P a g e 2 of
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time did Defendant tell Cynthia West that he had a gun, give her a note to the effect
that he had a gun or make any statements which she inferred to imply that he had a gun.

8.

That upon entering the store where Jennifer Forsgren worked ( Count III, Case no.
041900176), the Defendant had his right hand in his pocket, put a bag on the counter
and said "Put the money in the bag". Ti\at29. That Jennifer Forsgren did not see
any fingers or anything protruding from the Defendant's pocket and indicated that the
Defendant merely stood with his hand resting in his pocket down by his side. Ti\ at
32. That Jennifer Forsgren indicated that the Defendant at no time said that he had a
gun, did not give her a note that he had a gun and did not verbally threaten her in any
way. Trat32.

9.

That Jennifer Forsgren said that the Defendant had one hand out and one hand in his
pocket and therefore, she "...just assumed he had something in there, something that
led me to believe that he had something." Tr. At 33.

10.

That Allan Cantonwine (Count IV, Case no. 041900176) testified that when he came
into the store the Defendant was behind the counter with another employee. Tr, At 36.

11.

That Allan Cantonwine indicated that there was a baggie sitting on the counter and that
the Defendant told him to put the money in the bag. Tr. at 37.
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12.

That Allan Cantonwine testified that the Defendant had his right hand in his sweatshirt
pocket with a finger extended and stated that "It could have been a candy bar, a finger
a gun."

13.

TL.

at 37.

That Allan Cantonwine testified that at no time did the Defendant say that he had a gun,
verbally threaten either individual in the store or give a note indicating that he had a
gun. Trat44.

14.

That Julie Valdez (Count I, Case no. 041900182) testified that the Defendant came into
her business, which is a non-retail business, and stated "Give me your money." Tr at
61.

15.

That Julie Valdez testified that the Defendant had his right hand in his pocket and a
finger was protruding out a few inches from his body. Tr. at 63.

16.

That the Defendant never said that he had a gun and did not threaten with a gun and,
"...[h]e was very nice-spoken, soft-spoken, not aggressive, not anything that would
make you think that he was going to cause you harm." Ti\ at 66.

17.

That in fact, Julie Valdez stated that she kind of didn't think the Defendant had a gun
because the bulge wasn't big enough. Tr at 66.
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18.

That Esther Cho (Count II, Case no. 041900182) testified the Defendant had his right
hand in his pocket and pointed, not necessarily towards her, at the time he asked for
money. Tn at 70.

19.

That at no time did Defendant tell Esther Cho that he had a gun, give her a note
indicating that he had a gun or make threats in any other way. Tr\ at 72.

20.

That the Court specifically found that there were no verbal representations of the
Defendant's intent to use violence or any verbal representations that he had a gun or
weapon of any kind.

21.

That the Court specifically found that the testimony of all of the witnesses at the
Preliminary Hearing was essentially there was a bulge in the Defendant's right pocket
with his hand in his pocket and some of the witnesses said that something was
protruding, and could have been a Tootsie roll, a piece of candy, a finger, or a gun.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That under the specific facts of this case that there was insufficient evidence to establish
that the Defendant had made a "representation" of a dangerous weapon sufficient to
comply with the requirements set forth under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. And, that
given that there were no verbal statements accompanied by any physical action similar
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to the "representation" found in State v. Canderlario. 909 P.2nd 277 (Utah App. 1995)
the Court finds that under the specific facts of this case that they do not sufficiently
meet the requirements of a representation required by case law in the State of Utah and
that this conclusion is equitable and fair under the law.
2.

That Defendant's motion to reduce Counts I through IV in Case no. 01900176 to
Second Degree Felonies is hereby granted.

3.

The Defendant's motion to reduce Counts I and II in Case no. 041900782 to Second
Degree Felonies is hereby granted.
DATED this

0_<tey of Mi?, 2004.

/

'

JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS
Third District Court
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ADDENDUM B

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a
robbery.

76-1-601.

Definitions.

Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title:
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech.
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in
a criminal action.
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of
physical condition.
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission.
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means:
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and:
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads
the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death
or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other
manner that he is in control of such an item.
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state.
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act
and the actor is capable of acting.
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or unincorporated association.
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise
dominion or control over tangible property.
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of
death.
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to
serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain,
temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impainnent of the function
of any bodily member or organ.
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting,
printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of
recording information or fixing information in a form capable of being
preserved.
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P R O C E E D I N G S
* * * * *

THE COURT:

Okay, we are here in the matter —

in two

matters involving the same defendant, Ryan Wayne Johnson, case
number 041900176, in which there are four counts of first
degree robbery, and case number 041900182, in which we've got
two counts of ag robbery.

I should note on the case I

referenced last, the one ending with the numbers 182, it was
originally filed as a three-count case, but only two counts
were bound over; is that correct?
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

That f s correct, your Honor.

All right.

robbery and ag robbery.

So in that case we had ag

And there is a motion with reference

to Count II only, as I understand it; is that correct?
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

That' s correct, your Honor.

Then turning to the companion case ending

with the numbers 176, I'll indicate for the record that there
are four counts, and they're all ag robberies and they all
involve gas stations.
I have taken the opportunity to read the Motion to
Quash Bind Over on Count II, the Memorandum in Support of
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Motion to Reduce Counts I through IV in the case ending with
the number 176 and Counts I and II in the case ending with the
number 00182.

I have nothing from the State.

I also have read

the transcript from the preliminary hearing and the State may
well have been relying on that.
In any event, I feel like I have a general
understanding of the testimony of the witnesses, at least what
they said at the preliminary hearing, and a general feel for
the case.

My understanding in that case is there would be four

ag robbery cases.

The theory —

no gun was ever seen.

I think we can all agree that

And there was no representation that the

person had a gun, except by pointing a finger or an object from
the pocket area, but no gun was verbally referenced in any of
the cases.
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

That's correct, your Honor.

Additionally, we have a clear I.D. on the

fourth of the ag robberies, but no I.D. on the other three.

So

the State is basically I suppose intending to rely upon the
fourth I.D. and the similarity of the crimes to provide enough
for —

to meet their burden with reference to all four counts;

isnf t that correct?
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:
omitted that.

Plus the confession.

Plus the confessery remarks; sorry, I

That takes care of the case in terms of my

understanding ending with the numbers 176.
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In the companion case, it's not really —

the facts

are not really that similar to the case I just alluded to.
doesn't involve a gas station, for example.
face and head; no white head scarf.

It

A scarf around the

There was a show up I.D.

for one of the victims as I understand where identification was
made, and no I.D. in the other instance.

I believe that was

the case where an Asian woman said all Americans look the same
to her.
MR. ANDERSON:
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:
remark —

Yes.
And my response was, Tuchae.

I did note that.

And I note that the

not your remark but her remark —

was interesting.

Anyway, that's my understanding of the facts.

And you are

welcome to clarify or correct me if I'm wrong, but that's what
I understand.
MR. UPDEGROVE:
the

I'm a bit upset, your Honor, on

—
THE COURT:

What did I say?

MR. UPDEGROVE:

Oh, no, no, you said that you didn't

get my response, it was sent on the 12
THE COURT:

of May

—

Well, what I said, Mr. Updegrove, and I

want to correct this so that you are not upset, I didn't say I
didn't get it, I said it isn't in the file.

And while that

appears to be a distinction without a difference, it's a huge
distinction because I have every confidence that you sent it,
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it just did not make its way upstairs.
like to look at it.

So I would very much

But I do not hold it against you that it

didnf t get to the file, and that' s more often the case than not
with our filing system.
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

If I might, your Honor

—

Ifm happy, of course, to hear anything

you have to say.
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

If I might

—

Surely.

MR. UPDEGROVE:

—

give you —

if you want a chance

to take a quick read through.
THE COURT:

Why don't I do that.

I've been handed

the State's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Quash Bind Over of Count II in the case ending with the numbers
0182.

And I've been handed a Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendantf s Motion to Reduce Counts in both cases.

Let me take

a minute and read them.
I f 11 tell you at the outset, gentlemen, not to
indicate that I've made up my mind prematurely, but of course
the heart of this is the legal authority and also the
transcript from the preliminary hearing.

And this will perhaps

aid you in the points that you want to get to or what If m more
interested in.

I'm more concerned about the reduction of

counts or dismissal than quashing one of the counts, if that
makes sense.
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MR. UPDEGROVE:

That!s what concerns you is the

dismissal?
THE COURT:

My concern is that the case law that

Mr. Anderson has alluded to seems to make it quite clear that
while you don't need to see a gun, certainly you need to have
something more than just a finger pointing.

In other words,

verbal threat seems to be required if you don't actually see

—

or at least a reference to the gun if you donf t actually see
the object.
MR. UPDEGROVE:
Honor, if you —

And thatfs the Sunnyville case.

Your

did you read where the Sunnyville case was pre

1989.
THE COURT:

Yes, I did.

MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

It was '87.

And I recognize that the law was changed

and broadened, but still it appears clear to me that more is
required than a gesture.

I think if the gun is not displayed,

you still need to have some words that accompany the gesture.
Why don't we begin our dialogue with that, Mr. Updegrove,
because I may well be mistaken.
MR. UPDEGROVE:

Certainly.

Of course, not to beat a

dead horse, the language that your Honor is referring to is
uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in the
statute.

Uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon.

course the threat —

or rather —

And of

or rather when we talk about
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a d. .gerous weapon, a dangerous weapon is defined as an item
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; obviously a
gun, knife, club, something of that nature.
representation of the item.

A facsimile or

And a facsimile or representation,

we certainly say that sticking your finger out from your
sweatshirt or your jacket, pointing it at someone is
representation of a weapon.

And, and here is where I think we

make it, the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item
leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to
cause death or serious bodily injury.
the law as of '89.

So that's the State of

The facsimile representation, certainly the

finger suffices when it can't be seen.
THE COURT:

Well, I'm not sure of that.

That may be

an area where I have a question.
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

And

—

Facsimile would be a toy gun or an

inoperable weapon or something that looks like a gun that's
visually displayed.

I'm not sure that your hand in your pocket

or even a finger protruding is sufficient.

The witnesses said

it could have been a gun, it could have been, quote, a Tootsy
Roll, it could have been a candy bar, it could have been a
finger•
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

True.

And that none of them were certain as to

what it was.
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MR. UPDEGROVE:
comes in.

And that's where the second part

I agree it was not a facsimile of a gun, it was a

representation of a dangerous weapon.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. UPDEGROVE:

It's a facsimile or representation.

And when we go down, and I made some more notes from what we
had put down in the response, and when you take a look at the
first one, when you look now at representation and the fear
that the representation caused, fear of death or serious bodily
injury, and why they did what they did.

I won f t go in —

the first one, Lisa Ovard, I ! m not going to talk —
about the face wrapped in the T-shirt.
jacket pocket.

and

she talked

The hand in the right

Said, Put the money in the bag.

You have a

hand here, his hand is in his pocket, something is pointed
toward you protruding and you are told to put the money in the
bag.

What did she think?

dangerous weapon.

That' s the representation of a

What did she think as far as death or

danger?
THE COURT:

She thought there was a strong

possibility that it was a gun and acted accordingly.
MR. UPDEGROVE:

And she said the exact word was fear

for her life.
THE COURT:

Uh-huh, I recall.

MR. UPDEGROVE:

And that's Count I.

Count II, again given the plastic bag, it's described
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as a Ziplock bag without a Ziplock.

He said, Fill it.

It's

the sa:;ie hand all the way through, right hand in the pocket.
He looked like he had
THE COURT:

—
Is this the woman who said have a good

day?
MR. UPDEGROVE:

It was pretty eyes and the whole —

know that we got bizarre reading.

I

It looked like he had a gun

in his right hand, again feared for her life.

The

representation looked like it might be a gun in his hand, she
wasn't sure.

And she feared for her life.

That's Count II.

Jennifer Forsgren in Count III, Put money in the
bag

—
THE COURT:

It was the same state of mind with each

of them.
MR. UPDEGROVE:

Right hand.

Assumed he had a gun.

Allen Cantonwine, told to put money in the bag, right
hand in the pocket of a sweatshirt and he didn't say
anything

—
THE COURT:

But none of these people, and it's not a

point of dispute I don't think at all, none of these people
contend that the defendant, this individual, ever said anything
like I've got a gun and I'll shoot you or I'll blow you away.
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:
money in the bag.

That's true.

Or even you'll be sorry if you don't put

No reference was made to retaliatory conduct
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even.
MR. UPDEGROVE:

But Mr. Cantonwine said if it was a

gun, I didn!t want him to shoot me.
Paragraph nvunber five, Ms. Valdez —

now five and six

are on the same day.
THE COURT:

Yes, I'm aware of that.

MR. UPDEGROVE:

And he had changed his MO slightly.

He was wearing a hooded sweatshirt with a black cap in both of
the cases, but he didn't have the scarf wrapped around his
face.

Ms. Valdez said, Give me the money.

as a baby-faced, good looking kid.

And referred to him

She testified she was a

little frightened and the defendant was either pretending like
he had a gun or he did have one.

And of course Ms. Cho in

Count VI, the hooded sweatshirt, pointed his finger toward me.
Asked for money.

And Mr. Anderson's cross-examination it is

asked if it scared her.
have given him $20.

If he didn't threaten me I would not

However, his hand was in his pocket and

something was in there and I was scared.
Now, my reading of the statute, my reading of the law
is that he was using a representation and his object was to
frighten the people into giving him money.

Frighten the people

to the point where he might have a gun, they thought he had a
gun, he possibly had a gun.
THE COURT:

Okay.

We can agree that his object was

to frighten the people, or at least one could consider that
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that's the case if they heard the testimony.

But is that

sufficient under the law?
MR. UPDEGROVE:

I say it's sufficient under the law

for when you read it carefully and it says the representation
and when you get down to the phrases, the phrases here on —

in

76-1-601.5 concerning dangerous weapon, the actor's use or
apparent intended use of the item, meaning the representation
in this case, leads the victim to reasonably believe the item
is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury.

And if that

were not the case, then anyone could walk in, act like they had
a weapon, get money, walk out, and if they're caught, just like
Mr. Johnson is doing, saying, no, no, no, no, I didn't have a
weapon.

The worst you can do to me, the very worst you can do

to me is simple robbery.

I didn't have a weapon, I wanted them

to think I had a weapon.
THE COURT:
Let's talk about that.

Right.

What about the Candelario case?

Doesn't the Candelario case require

both a representation and a verbal representation?
MR. UPDEGROVE:

Let me see the date of that case,

your Honor.
THE COURT:
Appeals case.

Candelario is '95, and it's a Court of

Candelario is referenced in Mr. Anderson's

MR. UPDEGROVE:

—

I think it's referenced in mine too.

Yes, page 2.
THE COURT:

And there's also State versus Harkman.
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MR. UPDEGROVE:
likeness of a weapon.

Facsimile refers to the physical

Representation refers to a picture,

model, statement or other reproduction.

Refers to a likeness,

statement or other reproduction.
THE COURT:
it's a finger —

Is a finger a —

a reproduction?

they're not even clear

It could be a Tootsy Roll

somebody said.
MR. UPDEGROVE:

It could be a Tootsy Roll.

object of what Mr. Johnson was doing was —

But the

his object is to

want them to give him money through force —

through fear of

using deadly force.
THE COURT:

Right.

the facts are to be believed.

So you f ve got a clear robbery, if
If the witnesses have testified

credibly, the jury could well conclude that you've got
robberies.
My question is do you have ag robberies, and
obviously that's the point of the motion.
MR. UPDEGROVE:
when you use the word —
THE COURT:

And I believe we do through the
now Candelario

—

Blast you, or I'll blast you, so there's

a verbal representation as well as a
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

—

—

Which he didn't do.

Well, he didn't blast anybody, but

threatening language, a verbal representation, if you will, was
made in that case.

It seems like all the case law where they
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found aggravated robbery, since changing the law, has required
some kind of verbal representation.
MR. UPDEGROVE:
as

I don't believe that's correct as far

—
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. UPDEGROVE:
shoot you and/or I

—

THE COURT:
to shoot you.

As you don't have to say I'm going to

You certainly don't have to say I'm going

But to say I have a gun or something of that

nature seems to be required beyond a finger or a possible
finger in the pocket.
MR. UPDEGROVE:
such that a —
threat.

My understanding isn't the law as

there's a verbal threat and there's a nonverbal

Obviously in this case we have a nonverbal threat.
THE COURT:

I understand.

MR. UPDEGROVE:

He is saying to those people I have a

gun without saying to them I have a gun.
THE COURT:
under the law?
it is.

And my question is is that sufficient

And I understand the State's position is that

If you want to say anything about Count II on the

motion to quash.
MR. UPDEGROVE:
the —

you read my

I would submit it.

I would submit on

—

THE COURT:

Cursory, but it was well written and to

the point.
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Mr. Anderson.
MR. ANDERSON:

Your Honor, our position is that it is

not a sufficient representation just having your hand in your
pocket.

It doesn't distinguish the case sufficiently to make

it a first degree felony versus a second degree felony.
THE COURT:

Are you relying on Candelario for that?

MR. ANDERSON:

Yes, your Honor.

And also even in the

language of the statute where it says a facsimile or
representation of the item.

An item is described as capable of

causing death or serious bodily injury.

I think it's talking

something beyond one simple body part, but something like akin
to a facsimile that is presented in such a way that would give
the impression, more than just a hand in your pocket.
I think that —

I am relying on Candelario and also

on Harkman, your Honor, which is again a verbal statement.

And

there hasn't been a case specifically addressing this issue in
Utah.

I mean, this may be the first one.

But I think that

there has not been a sufficient representation to separate it
from a second degree to a first degree aggravated felony.
THE COURT:

All right.

With reference to the motion

to quash Count II, it's denied.
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

Count II will go to trial.

MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Okay.

I am going to find that the motion to
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reduce the aggravated robberies to simple robberies is a motion
that's well taken and I'm going to grant it.

I may be wrong in

my reading of Candelario and the statute, but I believe that it
requires more than just a hand in a pocket.
we've got.

And that's all

Some of these people don't even know if it was a

finger pointing out as a gun.
I think more is required for aggravated robbery and I
think the case law is clear that more is required for a
representation, at least that's my finding at this time, and
therefore we're going to trial on four counts in the case
ending with the numbers 176, but they're all going to be simple
robberies versus ag robberies.

And on the companion case we're

going to trial on two counts, and again we're talking about
simple robberies versus aggravated robberies.

There was

nothing different in terms of what was said or manifested.
Have we set a trial date?
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

We have not, your Honor.

For either of these?

We need to do that.

I guess, Mr. Updegrove, it's up to you to decide which of these
cases you would like to try first.
pick a trial date.

Why don't we go ahead and

Obviously the defendant is incarcerated.

Mr. Anderson, do you have any objection to you and
the defendant approaching?
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.

Mr. Updegrove, you can approach also.
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Closer.
MR- UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

Closer?

All the way.

Okay, thank you, you may all step back.
Which case, Mr. Updegrove, would you prefer to try
first?
MR. UPDEGROVE:

The one ending in 176, your Honor,

the four counts.
THE COURT:

Okay.

And that was my guess.

Is the

defendant being held on anything else at this juncture?
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:
it ideally?

He is not, your Honor.

All right.

So when would you like to try

As soon as possible?

MR. UPDEGROVE:
MR. ANDERSON:

He's in jail.
Yes, your Honor.

something after the second week in June.
for you

I f m booked up.
If you have
If that's too soon

—
MR. UPDEGROVE:

I have something on the 1 7 t h of

June.
THE COURT:

You do have something or you're clear on

the 17 t h ?
MR. UPDEGROVE:

No, your Honor, I have something on

the 1 7 t h of June.
THE COURT:

Let's see if we can do that.

He f s in

custody and at this point hasn't waived his right to a speedy
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trial to go beyond June, so we need to find a date, I would
say, before the 19

of June, unless there's some kind of

agreement to a later date.
MR. ANDERSON:

The week of the 1 4 t h would be great.

THE CLERK:

We could do June 1 4 t h .

THE COURT:

How about June 14 t h ?

MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

That would be fine with me.

Mr. Updegrove?

MR. UPDEGROVE:

I wish I had brought my

—

THE CLERK:

Can you call?

THE COURT:

Do you want to use the phone and call

your secretary?
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

I think I probably should.

Why don't you do that.

We'll go off the

record for a moment.
(Off-the-record discussion.)
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

—

Yes, on the record.

MR. UPDEGROVE:
you have made through the
THE COURT:

Your Honor

I need of course the findings of fact
—

I ! m going to have Mr. Anderson prepare

findings of fact with specificity talking about the fact that
what I started out by saying, that everyone has agreed that
there was no verbal representation to a crime of violence.

Not

Ifm going to blow you away or you're going to regret this or
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I'm going to kill you.

No representation to a gun or to a

weapon at all, that there was merely essentially a bulge in the
pocket.

And some witnesses said that the bulge was protruding.

That's as good as it gets, is my understanding.
MR. UPDEGROVE:

And if I might, your Honor, in the

direction or exactly toward a couple of the
THE COURT:

—

Well, there's an inconsistency on that.

I think some of the witnesses said that it seemed to be pointed
or directed toward them, others just said that the hand was in
the pocket and the hand in the pocket was on the counter not
pointing toward them.

I think you have both.

And so if you would address with specificity what
each witness said with reference to each count, that would be
helpful.
And also that some witnesses spoke of the fact that
they thought it was either a gun or a finger or a Tootsy Roll
or candy of some kind, depending upon which witness we're
talking of.
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:
today and on —

All right, your Honor.

Incidentally, and I'm making a ruling

I may be wrong, but this is the ruling that I

believe is equitable and fair under the law, but I am not for
one minute making any kind of statement that a person facing
someone with a hand in their pocket that's pointed in their
direction may not feel as great of fear as someone who
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questions what the object is, but has a concern, so let's be
perfectly clear that I'm not condoning this conduct in any way.
MR. UPDEGROVE:

And Pat would right conclusions of

law in the record?
MR. ANDERSON:
MR. UPDEGROVE:
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

How soon could you get that?
Hopefully by Monday.

Why don t we give you a week.

we give you until the 26
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

Certainly.

Why don't

.
Okay.

That gives you a little bit longer.

Now, let's see, we talked about the 17

of June, I

think.
THE CLERK:

June 1 4 t h .

THE COURT:

Excuse me, June 1 4 t h , I wasn't looking

at the calendar.

Do you want to call, Mr. Updegrove?

MR. UPDEGROVE:

Certainly.
tli

THE COURT:

What about June 1

THE CLERK:

That would work as well.

THE COURT:

So what about June 7 t h , Mr. Anderson?

r

so we have two

dates.

MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

That would be fine.

So you have those two dates that you can

choose from.
MR. UPDEGROVE:

I'm going to be visiting my father in
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San Antonio up until the 1st.
THE COURT:

Why don't you get on the phone and see.

(Off-the-record discussion.)
THE COURT:

Incidentally, Mr. Anderson, I!m not

saying that there may not be circumstances under which the
representation, nonverbal representation, is sufficient, but
under these particular circumstances I do not find it to be
sufficient for aggravated robbery.

I'm not saying that a hand

in a pocket accompanied by certain gestures or whatever might
not be sufficient under some circumstances, but this is just
not the case.
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

Okay.

And reference the case law that applies.

MR. ANDERSON:

I certainly will.

(Off-the-record discussion.)
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

The 1 4 t h is a bad day.

The 7 t h

—

Youf re going to have to make one of them

work.
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

We're trying to set a jury trial.

For someone in custody.

The only other

possibility is what about the 21 st , Michelle?
THE CLERK:

That works for our calendar.

THE COURT:

You can do 7 t h , 1 4 t h , or 2 1 s t .

MR. UPDEGROVE:
MR. ANDERSON:

Okay, the 2 1 s t .
The 2 1 s t is fine, your Honor.
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THE COURT:

All right, we're back on the record.

Mr. Anderson, you just said okay that will work when we spoke
of the 21 st of June as the trial date.

Now, for the record,

that is about two or three days beyond the 30 days.

Does your

client waive his right to a speedy trial with that date in
mind?
THE DEFENDANT:
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

He said yes, your Honor.

And I believe he said no problem.

THE DEPENDANT:
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

No problem.

No problem.
He said no problem.

So noted.

And he waives his right to a

speedy trial on the companion case as well, which we ! re not
setting at the present time, is that correct?
MR. ANDERSON:

She'll set it as soon as she possibly

can after this case is resolved.
THE COURT:

And one thing that happens sometimes,

Mr. Johnson, is that when one case is tried it results in a
resolution of the other case.

Some kind of plea is offered,

there may be some plea bargain offered after today in any
event.

But we can't try both cases on the same day and we

can't try both of them in 30 days unless you absolutely insist
on it, and that puts your lawyer, in my opinion, at a real
disadvantage.

So do you waive your right to a speedy trial?

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.
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THE COURT:

In other words, I have given you a date

that's about 30 days from now.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Okay.

If the other case needs to be tried,

we'll set it within 30 days of the other case.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Okay?

Do you waive your right with that

in mind?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Yes, Mr. Updegrove.

MR. UPDEGROVE:

I'm sorry, your Honor, 8:30 on the

21 s t ?
THE COURT:

8:30 on the 2 1 s t .

You missed my joke,

0830.
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

0830, your Honor.

0830, okay.

And we're going to pre-try

this on the 1 1 t h at 0830.
MR. UPDEGROVE:
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

Now

—

I'm writing 0830 on my paper here.

Yeah, like we would think it was 8:30,

the other 8:30 would be 1630, wouldn't it?
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

No, it would be —

MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

What's this?
8:30 p.m. would be?

2030.

2030, okay.

I still haven't quite got
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it.
MR. UPDEGROVE:

The 404 (b) requires that I give

notice of 404 (b).
THE COURT:

And I'm going to find for the record that

you have given notice of 404 (b) evidence that I believe there
is a sufficiency here of what I would call MO factors or common
factors that the 404 of the evidence at this point looks like
it's viable.
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

Right.

MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

One to the other.

Both cases.

Well, I can't say that the case with four

counts can be used in the other case, but the four counts can
certainly be used

—

MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

Oh, certainly, the four counts.

Do you know what I'm saying?

articulating it very poorly.

I'm

You don't have an I.D. on all

four of your counts in the case that's going to trial first,
but you can certainly use the other counts to —

or you do have

an I.D. to bolster in terms of the other case, I don't know
that reference to that is going to be allowed.
common elements that I recall.

There are not

But as to the two counts in the

remaining case, there does seem to be some commonality.
MR. UPDEGROVE:

And I guess, your Honor, could

determine from my questions about the finding factors and the
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order, I'm obviously going to call the AG and see what they
think and if they think it's worth —
a —

and obviously we have

we would be at all stop until they did their thing.
THE COURT:

You mean filing an appeal?

MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

That's harsh.

Well, it doesn't bother me if you want to

file an appeal.
MR. UPDEGROVE:

But I have to have them tell me

whether they think that it's an appealable issue.
THE COURT:

Obviously you have the right to check

with them and do whatever you deem to be appropriate.

But I'm

going to press forward because this defendant is incarcerated
and has the right to a speedy trial.
I think I'm right.

Okay.

MR. UPDEGROVE:
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

And frankly, on this one

Yes, ma'am.
Okay.

And you were on the phone, I don't know

if you heard me say that I'm not making a finding that in every
case where what we have is a hand in a pocket that that
automatically means that it's insufficient.

But on these

facts, I find that it's insufficient in this context, for what
it's worth.
Okay, I think that takes care of everything.
MR. ANDERSON:
THE DEFENDANT:

Thank you, your Honor.
Thank you, your Honor.
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(Proceedings concluded at 2:36 p.m.)
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We're in recess.
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